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1. Introductory remarks
The problem of the first ground as a 
metaphysical problem is connected with the 
“Subject – Object” dichotomy. The subject can 
be either active (able to start the new chains 
of causes) or passive (unable to start the new 
chains of causes in the world determined by the 
first cause) in the context of understanding this 
attitude. The metaphysical question arises also 
about the object: “Is there a first cause in the 
world?” and “What character does it have?” To 
answer these questions we return to the two polar 
points of view: 
1. In the relation to the object: Is the world 
free from the external cause?
2. In the relation to the subject: Can the 
human act be free or can not?
In all cases the two points of view cannot 
fully exist without an understanding of the action 
content, which depends on the principle or law in 
the field of moral, it is because the subject interacts 
with the outer world, and this interaction has a 
moral character (meaning the constant situation 
of choice and decision making).
That is why the ontological and 
epistemological questions ought to be considered 
in close connection with practical philosophy. 
And if this is so, then the principle of sufficient 
reason can contain the question of free will 
(inasmuch as we think about the will’s first cause 
character), which in turn realizes itself in the 
moral principles. 
2. The principle of sufficient reason  
in Christian Wolff’s system
There was such a mass of contradictions in 
the eighteenth century, concerned with a search 
of the first ground and the problem of free will 
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− these questions had to be resolved and the 
attempts of resolving were presented in Kant’s 
and Schopenhauer’s philosophy. We should 
notice that their source for the interpretation was 
Wolffian philosophy and his main method, i.e. the 
principle of sufficient reason.
Academic life in Europe in the eighteenth 
century was still proceeding under the 
dominance and authority of Aristotle. But the 
French enlighteners (Pierre Bayle, Charles-Louis 
de Montesquieu, Denis Diderot, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau) had provoked the revision of the 
religion and metaphysics. The role of the Wolffian 
Philosophy was not the last in that situation. 
Chr. Wolff’s orientation on its universality and 
general validity had changed the philosophical 
structure of knowledge and updated the writing 
style (Zhuchkov, 2001, p. 17). 
I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer had also 
apprehended the Wolffian influence. Wolffian 
universality had impacted on Kant’s priority of 
mathematics and logic (Farmann, 2001, p. 115), 
and the applied character of the Wolffian system 
paid the Schopenhauer’s attention. But in spite of 
this, as professor V. A. Zhuchkov supposes, most 
of aims had not been achieved by Wolff and his 
followers: 
“He could not make a synthesis, to find the 
unity between the contrary categories of 
his philosophy <…> and methodological 
principles (the principle of contradiction 
and the principle of sufficient reason)”  
(Zhuchkov, 2001, p. 17-18). 
And so, I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer had 
to create new philosophical approaches to the old 
unresolved problems.
The principle of sufficient reason is a basis 
and source for all of Wolff’s system. In the 
preliminary part of Logic Wolff postulates the 
principle as follows: “Metaphysici docent, nihil 
esse sine ratione sufficiente atque hunc canonem 
appelitant principium rationis sufficientis” 
(Wolff, 1997, S. 1). He analysis this principle in 
§70 his Ontology: 
“Nothing exists without a sufficient reason 
for why it exists rather than does not 
exist. That is, if something is posited to 
exist, something must also be posited that 
explains why the first thing exists rather 
than does not exist. For either nothing 
exists without a sufficient reason for why 
it exists rather than does not exist, or else 
something can exist without a sufficient 
reason for why it exists rather than does not 
exist (§53). Let us assume that some A exists 
without a sufficient reason for why it exists 
rather than does not exist. (§56) Therefore 
nothing is to be posited that explains why A 
exists. What is more, A is admitted to exist 
because nothing is assumed to exist: since 
this is absurd (§69), nothing exists without a 
sufficient reason; and if something is posited 
to exist, something else must be assumed 
that explains why that thing exists” (Wolfio, 
1730, p.47).
The main question in Wolf’s explanation is 
concerned with understanding: how to define the 
essence of a thing, given that a thing exists, and if 
this essence is sufficient reason of this thing? It is 
difficult to give a quick answer to it, as professor 
V. A. Zhuchkov also deems:
“These Wolff’s statements are obscure. 
Where should we find a “sufficient reason”: 
at the real existence like the ground of 
cognition of its possibility and essence or, 
vice verse, at possibility of the essence like 
the ground of the real existence? <…> Wolff 
faces up with the undecidable situation, and 
to find the exit, it is necessary to break the 
contradiction principle and the principle 
of sufficient reason by itself” (Zhuchkov, 
2001, p. 48).
As we can see, Wolff’s arguments, 
concerning the principle of sufficient reason 
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do not look obvious, because of their “being = 
consciousness” identity. This is a general condition 
of rationalism. In his rational psychology, as R. J. 
Richards notices: 
“The soul has an essence (Ontol. #143), 
and this essence contains the sufficient 
reason for those things beyond itself which 
constantly occur in the soul or can occur in 
it” (Richards, 1980, p. 236). 
If this so, the soul is represented by being 
and being is represented in the soul, therefore 
it must exist according to the sufficient reason, 
which coordinates and initiates such correlation 
between soul and being. The postulating of the 
sufficient reason generates the statement about 
God, necessity, or absolute Mind. When we insist 
on the existence of something, this something 
must have its own source of existence, in turn this 
source must have its own source and so on, till 
we will find the prime cause, i.e. absolute Mind, 
or in other words, God, in this constant regress of 
meditation. In this situation the term “God” is a 
convenient means to justify the abstract objects in 
metaphysics. And it is the usual way of dogmatic 
rationalism.
3. Immanuel Kant’s interpretation  
of the principle of sufficient reason 
In Principiorum primorum cognitions 
metaphysicae (further − Nova Dilucidatio) Kant 
thoroughly scrutinizes the logic principles and 
marks out the principle of sufficient reason among 
of them. Kant critically accepts this principle, 
which had been formulated by G. W. Leibniz 
and was spread in philosophical practice by Chr. 
Wolff. 
First of all. Kant analyses this principle 
from the “subject – predicate” point of view, 
where the subject, as the basis, defines the 
predicate. Hence the name “the principle of 
sufficient reason” was being transformed to the 
“ratio determinans” (connected with the casual 
relation) by Kant (Kant AAI, Nova Dilucidatio, 
S.388)1.
Secondly, Kant declines the possibility of 
self-sufficiency of reason, which we can see in 
Wolff’s system:  
“Exsistentiae suae rationem aliquid habere 
in se ipso, absonum est.<...> Novi quidem 
ad notionem ipsam Dei provocari, qua 
determinatam esse exsistentiam ipsius 
postulant, verum hoc idealiter fieri, non 
realiter, facile perspicitur” (Kant AA I. Nova 
Dilucidatio. Prop. VI. S. 394). 
Such reason cannot exist for Kant because 
the logical subject, being reason, has to be 
determined by the exclusion one of the posit 
predicates, according to the principle of 
contradiction. But if both predicates are excepted, 
so it used to be ex-determinated reason, having 
been initiated by the causal chains: by God 
(Ritzel, 1985, S. 32).
Thirdly, Kant gets over the dogmatically 
posited metaphysical boundaries, when he 
debates on the first cause or reason. He applies 
the smart usage of God-noumenon for justifying 
the freedom of human acts. Already in this 
pre-critical work Kant clearly understands the 
difference between moral and natural worlds, 
and moral world is characterized by the ability of 
spontaneous act:
“Spotaneitas est actio a principio interno 
profecta. Quando haec repraesentationi 
optimi conformiter determinatur, dicitur 
libertas. Quo certius huic legi obtemperare 
quisque dicitur, quo itaque positis omnibus 
ad volendum motivis est determinatior, 
eo homo est liberior” (Kant AA I. Nova 
Dilucidatio, S. 402). 
Fourthly, Kant introduces two new 
principles, which complement the principle of 
sufficient reason (the principle of succession and 
the principle of co-existence). The principle of 
succession [principium succesionis] (temporal 
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principle) maintains connection among the 
changeable occurrences that, in Kant’s opinion, 
justifies the existence of the things and external 
world (Kant AA I. Nova Dilucidatio. Prop. 
XIII, S. 412). The principle of co-existence 
[principium coexistentiae] states that external 
causality and substances are dependent on each 
other (Kant AA I. Nova Dilucidatio. Usus 6, S. 
415). These two principles were used by Kant for 
his refutation of the dogmatic idealistic theory 
and pre-established harmony of Leibniz.
In the fundamental work Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft  (2te Auslage 1787) Kant does not 
mention the principle of sufficient reason directly, 
although he uses it as an example of false inquiry 
(Kant AA III, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, S. 510). 
The following parts of book (“Die Analytik der 
Grundsätze”, “Die transscendentale Dialektik”, 
and “Transscendentale Methodenlehre“) contain 
the problems addressed in the pre-critical work 
Nova Dilucidatio. The usage of the principle of 
sufficient reason goes together with the problem 
of free-will and moral law in the context of 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft: from instrumental-
formal to the substantive sense, when he applies 
the principle to the resolving of cosmological 
antinomy and postulating the moral world, 
that shows the transition to the transcendental 
idealism.
For instance, in the “Die Analytik der 
Grundsätze” Kant describes the schema of unity 
in the table of categories, which is instrumental in 
the application of the principle of sufficient reason. 
In other words, he shows it like a method: 
«Das Schema der Gemeinschaft 
(Wechselwirkung) oder der wechselseitigen 
Causalität der Substanzen in Ansehung 
ihrer Accidenzen ist das Zugleichsein der 
Bestimmungen der Einen mit denen der 
Anderen nach einer allgemeinen Regel» 
(Kant AA III, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
S. 138). 
I think that the thought about the co-
existence of substances is used here like a ready 
instrument and its sources can be found at the 
“Nova Dilucidatio”, where the God is described 
as a common rule and ground: 
“Cum ergo, quatenus substantiarum 
singulae independentem ab aliis habent 
exsistentiam, nexui earum mutuo locus 
non sit, in finita vero utique non cadat, 
substantiarum aliarum causas esse, nihilo 
tamen minus omnia in universo mutuo 
nexu colligata reperiantur, relationem 
hanc a communione causae, nempe Deo, 
exsistentium generali principio, pendere 
confitendum est” (Kant AA I. Nova 
Dilucidatio. Usus 6, S. 413).
Such an instrumental usage of the principle 
of sufficient reason is valid only for the field of 
pure reason but the understanding of causality is 
expressed in the thought about co-existence of 
substances.
In the “Die transscendentale Dialektik”, 
during the resolving of the antinomies of pure 
reason, Kant formulates his own discipline, i.e. 
transcendental idealism, which has the basic 
statement: “Es sind demnach die Gegenstände 
der Erfahrung niemals an sich selbst, sondern 
nur in der Erfahrung gegeben und existiren 
außer derselben gar nicht” (Kant AA III, Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft, S. 339-340). As a result, 
reason can function in two ways: constitutively 
and regulative, which is a difference between 
Kant and his predecessors, who made an attempt 
to apply the ideas of pure reason directly to the 
objects itself. Having explained this complicity 
of his predecessors, Kant in the subsection 
“Auflösung der kosmologischen Idee” goes on to 
describe freedom, of course in the area of pure 
reason. The problem of freedom is understood by 
him in terms of causality, which comes out from 
the essence of the principle of sufficient reason 
applied to the infinite chains of pre-determined 
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grounds. These forms of causality exist outside 
of the nature: 
“Wenn dagegen Erscheinungen für 
nichts mehr gelten, als sie in der That 
sind, nämlich nicht für Dinge an sich, 
sondern bloße Vorstellungen, die nach 
empirischen Gesetzen zusammenhängen, 
so müssen sie selbst noch Gründe haben, 
die nicht Erscheinungen sind. Eine 
solche intelligibele Ursache aber wird in 
Ansehung ihrer Causalität nicht durch 
Erscheinungen bestimmt, obzwar ihre 
Wirkungen erscheinen und sie durch 
andere Erscheinungen bestimmt werden 
können. Sie ist also sammt ihrer Causalität 
außer der Reihe, dagegen ihre Wirkungen 
in der Reihe der empirischen Bedingungen 
angetroffen werden. Die Wirkung kann 
also in Ansehung ihrer intelligibelen 
Ursache als frei und doch zugleich in 
Ansehung der Erscheinungen als Erfolg 
aus denselben nach der Nothwendigkeit 
der Natur angesehen werden…” (Kant 
AA III, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, S. 
365). 
We find a similar explanation in “Nova 
Dilucidatio”:
“Verum modus, quo certitudo earum 
rationibus suis determinatur, omnem 
paginam facit ad libertatis notam tuendam; 
nempe nonnisi per motiva intellectus 
voluntati applicata eliciuntur, cum contra ea 
in brutis s. physico-mechanicis actionibus 
omnia sollicitationibus et impulsibus 
externis conformiter, absque ulla arbitrii 
spontanea inclinatione, necessitentur” 
(Kant AA I. Nova Dilucidatio, S. 400).
Both quotations demonstrate Kant’s 
intention to realize the transition from the world 
of nature with the priority of the necessary 
“cause – effect” relation, to the world of freedom, 
where intelligible cause determines the maxim of 
the human act and this determination lies in the 
subject.
Such transition allows underlining 
close correlation between ethics and general 
philosophy that shows insufficiency means to 
resolve the external question only from the points 
of epistemology.
Finally, Kant’s section “Transcendentale 
Methodenlehre” embodies the idea of freedom 
in the form of moral law, i. e. categorical 
imperative, the ground of the human behavior. At 
this moment we can see fundamental difference 
between Kant’s philosophy and pre-Kantian 
dogmatic metaphysics, where the principle of 
sufficient reason had been applied everywhere: 
to the human, to the nature – what leads up to 
the postulating of God as the first ground. Kant 
had realized the transition from the world of 
nature to the world of freedom and showed their 
limits. Moreover Kant interprets the principle of 
sufficient reason as an incomplete argument in 
the area of pure reason, but believes that it can be 
useful in the area of practical reason. The main 
criteria of practical reason is freedom, which has 
already practical  matter: 
“Die praktische Freiheit kann durch 
Erfahrung bewiesen werden. Denn nicht 
bloß das, was reizt, d. i. die Sinne unmittelbar 
afficirt, bestimmt die menschliche Willkür, 
sondern wir haben ein Vermögen, durch 
Vorstellungen von dem, was selbst auf 
entferntere Art nützlich oder schädlich 
ist, die Eindrücke auf unser sinnliches 
Begehrungsvermögen zu überwinden; 
diese Überlegungen aber von dem, was 
in Ansehung unseres ganzen Zustandes 
begehrungswerth, d. i. gut und nützlich, 
ist, beruhen auf der Vernunft. Diese giebt 
daher auch Gesetze, welche Imperativen, 
d. i. objective Gesetze der Freiheit, sind, 
und welche sagen, was geschehen soll, ob 
es gleich vielleicht nie geschieht, und sich 
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darin von Naturgesetzen, die nur von dem 
handeln, was geschieht, unterscheiden, 
weshalb sie auch praktische Gesetze 
genannt werden“  (Kant AA III, Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft, S. 521).
The thought on the necessity of moral laws 
is expressed by Kant already in Nova Dilucidatio. 
The correlation among the basic terms in Kant 
philosophy concentrated in the principle of 
sufficient reason, interpreted in a different way 
from that of dogmatic metaphysics (for instance, 
by Wolff). 
The principle of sufficient reason was a 
convenient instrument to justify God’s existence 
and the world of God’s Kingdom was consequently 
the only one real and possible world. Kant had 
brought to bear the idea of the spontaneity of 
human action (which however does not reduce 
the strict determinism of the world of nature) 
to the principle of sufficient reason, and that 
accomplished the transition from dogmatism 
to criticism, where a human is described as an 
autonomous subject with the ability to have a 
freedom within him. The distinctive moment is 
precisely described by Professor S. A. Chernov:
“The idea of God is the “load-carrying 
element” of rationalism, which has to 
assume anyhow the being of absolute 
subject and eventually, to connect with the 
cause and source of true ideas of human 
mind, eo ipso detracting from its autonomy” 
(Chernov, 1998, p. 88-89). 
4. The principle of sufficient reason  
by Arthur Schopenhauer,  
compared with Wolff’s system elements
A. Schopenhauer writes:
„Sie ist überaus groß, da man ihn die 
Grundlage aller Wissenschaft nennen 
darf. Wissenschaft nämlich bedeutet 
ein System von Erkenntnissen, d.h. ein 
Ganzes von verknüpften Erkenntnissen, 
im Gegensatz des bloßen Aggregats 
derselben (Schopenhauer, 1986, S. 14). 
<…> Weiterhin soll gezeigt werden, daß 
der Satz vom zureichenden Grunde ein 
gemeinschaftlicher Ausdruck mehrerer a 
priori gegebener Erkenntnisse ist. Vorläufig 
muß er indessen in irgend einer Formel 
aufgestellt werden. Ich wähle die Wolfische 
als die allgemeinste: Nihil est sine ratione 
cur potius sit, quam non sit. Nichts ist ohne 
Grund warum es sei” (Schopenhauer, 1986, 
S. 15).
The great pessimist (according Patrick 
Gardiner’s expression) undertakes the historical 
and philosophical inquisition of the principle 
of sufficient reason. He begins to analyze it 
from Plato and Aristotle, eo ipso he builds 
clear historical parallels and shows, what Kant 
adopted from Leibniz and Aristotle. In doing 
so, Schopenhauer pays attention to the manner 
of philosophical rules. However, he absolutely 
does not take into consideration Kant’s work 
Nova Dilucidatio. The “Great pessimist” prefers 
the work Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle 
neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere 
entbehrlich gemacht werden soll (1790). This 
research does not concentrate on investigating 
of the principle of sufficient reason by itself, but 
rather it describes a priori synthetic judgments. 
Schopenhauer gives a high appraisal of Wolff, 
who, by his opinion, was the first man to define 
two meanings of the principle of sufficient reason. 
But Wolff had applied them just for the ontology 
and such an application could be made out with 
the strict reconstruction procedure.
Wolff’s rationalist system unites 
epistemological and ontological principles, 
making the identification “being = consciousness”. 
This identity does not provide a way to understand 
how many varieties the principle of sufficient 
reason has. Schopenhauer was aware of this lack 
of clarity and took note of it.  
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To introduce and scrutinize Schopenhauer’s 
types of the principle of sufficient reason, let us 
find and compare similar principles in Wolff’s 
texts. It will be useful to reconstruct the types 
of the principle. In the structure of comparison 
we follow Schopenhauer. He insists on this 
sequence: 1) principium rationis sufficiendi 
essendi; 2) principium rationis sufficiendi fiendi; 
3) principium rationis sufficiendi agendi; 4) 
principium rationis sufficiendi cognoscendi 
(Schopenhauer, 1986, S. 184). We will find the 
similar fragments from Wolff’s texts and correlate 
them with the Schopenhauer’s division.
A) Principium rationis sufficiendi essendi
Chr. Wolff: 
“Was demnach der Raum in denen Dingen 
ist, die neben einander zugleich sind, das ist 
die Zeit in denen, die nach einander sind, 
oder deren eines auf das andere folget (§. 
46. 94)“ (Wolff, 1733, S.47).
A. Schopenhauer:
„Raum und Zeit haben die Beschaffenheit, 
dass alle ihre Teile in einem Verhältnis zu 
einander stehen, in Hinsicht auf welches 
jeder derselben durch einen andern 
bestimmt und bedingt ist. Im Raum heißt 
dies Verhältnis Lage, in der Zeit Folge“ 
(Schopenhauer, 1986, S. 158).
B) Principium rationis sufficiendi fiendi
Chr. Wolff:
„Was demnach nicht aus nichts entstehen 
kann, muss einen zureichenden Grund 
haben, warum es ist <…> (Wolff, 1733, S. 
17). Was notwendig ist, ist auch ewig; das 
ist, kann weder Anfang noch Ende haben. 
Denn wenn etwas notwendig ist, so ist 
unmöglich, dass es nicht sein kann (§ 36.)“ 
(Wolff, 1733, S. 21).
A. Schopenhauer:
„Jede Wirkung ist, bei ihrem Eintritt, 
eine Veränderung und giebt, eben weil 
sie nicht schon früher eingetreten, 
unfehlbare Anweisung auf eine andere, 
ihr vorhergegangene Veränderung, 
welche, in Beziehung auf sie, Ursache, in 
Beziehung auf eine dritte, ihr selbst wieder 
nothwendig vorhergegangene Veränderung 
aber Wirkung heißt. Dies ist die Kette der 
Kausalität: sie ist notwendig anfangslos“ 
(Schopenhauer, 1986, S. 48-49).
C) Principium rationis sufficiendi agendi
Chr. Wolff:
“Wiederum da ein jedes vor sich bestehendes 
Ding eine Kraft hat, daraus, als au seiner 
Quelle seine Veränderungen fließen (§. 
114. 115); so muss auch die Seele eine 
vergleichen Kraft haben <…> (Wolff, 1733, 
S. 464). Indem wir uns aber unserer bewusst 
sind, so erkennen wir ihrer Unterscheid von 
uns (§. 730), und daher stellen wir uns die 
Sachen als außer uns vor (§. 45) (Wolff, 
1733, S. 468). Weil demnach diese Kraft 
der Grund ist von allem demjenigen, was 
veränderliches in der Seele vorgehet (§. 
754); so bestehet in ihr das Wesen der Seele 
(§. 33)“ (Wolff, 1733, S. 469).
A. Schopenhauer: 
„Das Subjekt des Erkennens kann, 
laut Obigem, nie erkannt, nie Objekt, 
Vorstellung, werden. Da wir dennoch nicht 
nur eine äußere (in der Sinnesanschauung), 
sondern auch eine innere Selbsterkenntnis 
haben, jede Erkenntnis aber, ihrem Wesen 
zufolge, ein Erkanntes und ein Erkennendes 
voraussetzt; so ist das Erkannte in uns, als 
solches, nicht das Erkennende, sondern 
das Wollende, das Subjekt des Wollens, 
der Wille. Von der Erkenntnis ausgehend 
kann man sagen »Ich erkenne« sei ein 
analytischer Satz, dagegen »Ich will« 
ein synthetischer und zwar a posteriori, 
nämlich durch Erfahrung, hier durch innere 
(d.h. allein in der Zeit) gegeben. Insofern 
wäre also das Subjekt des Wollens für uns 
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ein Objekt. Wenn wir in unser Inneres 
blicken, finden wir uns immer als wollend“ 
(Schopenhauer, 1986, S. 171).
D) Principium rationis sufficiendi 
cognoscendi
Chr. Wolff:
“Weil die Vernunft eine Einsicht in den 
Zusammenhang der Wahrheit ist (§. 368), 
die Wahrheit aber erkannt wird wenn man 
den Grund verstehet, warum dieses oder 
jenes sein kann (§. 145); so zeiget uns die 
Vernunft, warum dieses oder jenes sein 
kann“ (Wolff, 1733, S. 234).
A. Schopenhauer
„...Wenn ein Urtheil eine Erkenntniß 
ausdrücken soll, es einen zureichenden 
Grund haben muß: wegen dieser 
Eigenschaft erhält es sodann das Prädikat 
wahr. Die Wahrheit ist also die Beziehung 
eines Unheils auf etwas von ihm 
Verschiedenes, das sein Grund genannt 
wird...“ (Schopenhauer, 1986, S. 129).
This fragments show us that the Wolff’s 
thoughts have not very much in common with 
Schopenhauer’s intentions.  For instance, the first 
type of the principle of sufficient reason (essendi) 
by Wolff does not contain the term “causality”, 
because of the sequence of the occurrences 
does not prove their cause-effect correlation. 
Schopenhauer had seen this flaw. The third type 
of the principle of sufficient reason is formally 
similar with the Schopenhauer’s suggestion; 
however Wolff uses the term “force” instead 
“will”, which creates ambiguity.
5. Conclusion
Kant and Schopenhauer restricted the 
application of the principle of sufficient reason: 
Kant applied this principle only in his formal 
logic while the ontological side was analyzed 
in the principle of causality; Schopenhauer had 
enriched the principle of sufficient reason and 
continued to suggest the prime significance and 
importance it has for science. 
 But there is a difference between Kant 
and Schopenhauer’s points of view. The principle 
of sufficient reason (fourth type) by Schopenhauer 
is connected with the Will; it essentially 
substitutes the term “God” with “Will”, which is 
the thing-in-itself. That is why the Will is both 
the connective chain and expression of the free 
will as moral principle also. But such moral 
principle should be spread across all the world 
and all living organisms. If we accept it, we 
have to maintain the ubiquity of the influence 
of the moral principle, i.e. compassion principle, 
but here we do not need to discuss the essence 
of the compassion principle. I would like to 
underline this point, which clearly describes the 
difference between Kant and Schopenhauer: they 
both tried to move in the direction of ethics. But 
Kant confines the principle of sufficient reason 
to application to pure reason and also converts 
the principle to his practical philosophy, where 
morality is the sufficient reason for the realization 
of freedom. Schopenhauer also goes that way, 
however he justifies the external reason (ground), 
i.e. Will, which is not only sufficient reason for 
everything but also a condition for the functioning 
of the compassion principle, which does not limit 
ontology as a consequence of ethics, in contrast 
to Kant’s system. 
Finally, I would like to conclude that the 
principle of sufficient reason gives the possibility 
to find the problem of free will and moral law 
in indissoluble correlation. But as we have 
seen, the application and usage of the principle 
differs between Kant and Schopenhauer in the 
interpretation of reason and understanding. 
As a matter of fact, Schopenhauer carries the 
reason functions to the understanding, having 
applied the main principle of understanding – 
causality – to the things as representations. For 
Kant, the understanding can also be applied to 
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the transcendental objects, but only through the 
reason, which initiates the making of the a priori 
synthetic propositions for the possible experience 
in general: here the understanding cannot get the 
knowledge. There is a difference in epistemology 
between Kant and Schopenhauer: Kant ascribes 
to the reason regulative status and to the 
understanding – the possibility of the interaction 
with the reason:
“…Das Bewusstsein, einem solchen 
Gedanken zu haben, ist keine Erfahrung; 
eben darum, weil der Gedanke keine 
Erfahrung, Bewusstsein aber an sich nichts 
Empirisches ist. Gleichwohl aber bringt 
dieser Gedanke einen Gegenstand der 
Erfahrung hervor oder eine Bestimmung 
des Gemüths, die beobachtet werden 
kann, sofern es nämlich durch das 
Denkungsvermögen afficirt wird…“ (Kant, 
1867, S. 499). 
Schopenhauer and Kant both tried to 
interpret the principle of sufficient reason in their 
own manner, but we see the similar consequence 
of this: Kant critically analyses the principle and 
restricts its usage only in the field of ontology; 
Schopenhauer vice versa widens it and transfers 
to the transcendent world of Will. Either way 
the principle of sufficient reason opens the 
possibilities of the correlation of free will and 
moral law for further interpretation in all variants. 
And it is important point if we are going to build a 
full-fledged philosophical system.
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Закон достаточного основания  
как связующее звено «свободы воли»  
и «морального закона»  
в философии Канта и Шопенгауэра 
А.И. Троцак 
Балтийский федеральный университет имени И. Канта 
Россия, 236041, Калининград, Невского, 14
Анализируется закон достаточного основания в системах И. Канта и А. Шопенгауэра, 
проводятся параллели с метафизикой Х. Вольфа. Автор показывает, как закон достаточного 
основания трансформировался от Вольфа через Канта к Шопенгауэру и в каком виде он был 
использован (догматическом или критическом) как методологическое правило  построения 
философской системы.
Ключевые слова: закон достаточного основания, субъект, объект, причина.
